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SILENCING SLAPPs: AN EXAMINATION OF PROPOSED
LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES AND A "SOLUTION"
FOR FLORIDA
LAURA J. ERICSON-SIEEL
I. SLAPPs 101: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SLAPP
Although the United States is a country known for the strength of
its democratic system and Constitution, the judicial system is being
used in an attempt to silence citizens who exercise their right to free
speech. Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs,1
can be a surprisingly effective way to control or limit the small-scale
public debate that is an essential part of the democratic process.
While not filed in epidemic proportions, SLAPPs are attracting at-
tention in Florida. Attorney General Robert Butterworth's staff has
studied the phenomenon in the state and identified at least eighteen
suits that could be characterized as SLAPPS.2 Also, Florida lawmak-
ers have begun to realize the importance of addressing the problem
legislatively: Two anti-9LAPP bills were filed in the 1992 legislative
session.3 Although neither bill passed, the problems caused by
SLAPPs are serious enough that the bills should be revised and rein-
troduced in the 1993 session.
A. What Are SLAPP Suits?
SLAPPs are civil suits filed against non-governmental individuals
and/or groups, often because of communications with a government
body, official, or the electorate, on an issue of some public interest or
concern.4 Many SLAPP targets are citizens who have spoken out
about environmental issues such as continued development in a resi-
dential area or the location of hazardous waste sites.' Targets often
1. Professor Penelope Canan of the University of Denver College of Sociology and Profes-
sor George Pring of the University of Denver College of Law were the first to Identify these suits.
They have researched the phenomenon of SLAPP suits under the sponsorship of the National
Science Foundation Law and Social Science Program, Grant No. SES-8714495. Penelope Canan,
The SLAPPfrom a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. Rav. 23, n.* (1989).
2. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
3. Fla. HB 759 (1992) and Fla. SB 2188 (1992).
4. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PAcE
ENvTa. L. REv. 3, 7-8 (1989).
5. See Canan, supra note 1, at 25, identifying SLAPP targets as those who have challenged
a proposed new economic venture or government license application on one of four grounds: (1)
environmental concerns, such as threats to wilderness, natural areas, or endangered species; (2)
neighborhood concerns about siting of undesirable businesses in the area; (3) disgruntled consum-
ers or tenants; or (4) opponents of development.
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include animal rights activists,6 newspapers, 7 critical employees,' con-
sumer advocates, 9 citizens who sue police officers,' 0 and even Ku Klux
Klan members." Some suits are filed against entire groups and multi-
ple "John Doe" defendants-a warning to others that their names
could be substituted should they begin or continue involvement.'2
Typical targets of SLAPPs are citizens who have become involved
in the political process to oppose a single local issue. For example:
e A New York couple who petitioned village officials to force a
shopping-strip developer to close off a driveway leading from his pro-
ject to their residential street was sued for $3 million on allegations of
libel, defamation, and interference with business. 13
* A Florida man who protested the rezoning of a neighbor's prop-
erty from "agricultural" to "light industrial" at a county commis-
sioners' meeting was sued for more than $500,000 for defamation and
commission of a prima facie tort.' 4
6. Abuse of Dolphins, or Abuse of Process, MASS. L. WKtY., Sept. 30, 1991, at 29 [herein-
after Abuse of Dolphins] (the New England Aquarium filed a $5 million defamation countersuit
against three animal rights groups that had sued, alleging the aquarium failed to obtain a required
permit before transferring a captive dolphin to another institution).
7. Alex S. Jones, The Media Business: Press; Libel Threat Is Increasing Even for Small
Publications, N.Y. Tass, Feb. 3, 1992, at D8 (newspaper that published an article entitled How
Safe Is Your Insurance was sued by an insurance company that had been listed as "shaky").
8. Judith Nemes, Humana To Ask Judge To Overturn Award, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec.
16, 1991, at 3 (Chief of staff at a Humana hospital in Las Vegas was sued for criticizing the
corporation for, among other things, outlandish markups on ancillary services. He countersued
for abuse of process and was awarded nearly $10 million in compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.).
9. Andrew Leigh, SLAPP Suits: They Feel Great but Do They Pay Off?, INVESTOR's Bus.
DAILy, Jan. 31, 1992, at 8 (Upjohn Corporation sued a detractor of the drug Halcion for speaking
out publicly against the drug).
10. Todd Woody, Police Advocates: Officers May Fight King- Type Suits, RECOaER, July 1,
1991, at I (police officer cleared of brutality charges at an arbitration hearing sued the man who
had accused him and the law firm that represented the accuser for $2.1 million).
11. Leigh, supra note 9. The filers and targets do not always fall into a clear "big business"
versus "activist" relationship; even labor activist Cesar Chavez has filed an alleged SLAPP.
Chavez v. Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Law, 148 Cal. Rptr. 278 (Cal. 1978), identified as a
SLAPP in Pring, supra note 4, at 5 n.3. At least one commentator has suggested that Pring and
Canan were unconsciously biased in their identification of SLAPP suits and did not recognize
suits by environmentalists who have abused the legal process. See Richard 0. Brooks, Les Mains
Sales: The Ethical and Political Implications of SLAPP Suits, 7 PACE ENVT.. L. Rav. 61, 66
(1989).
12. See John J. Fried, Debate Rages Over Developers' Lawsuits To Hinder Public Participa-
tion, Cm. Tai., June 23, 1991, at 1G.
13. See Diana Shaman, In the Region: Long Island; On the Docket: Residents v. Developers,
N.Y. Tnsms, Mar. 22, 1992, § 10, at 8.
14. Before the suit was filed the defendant received a letter dated January 30, 1991, from the
plaintiff's attorney. The letter said the plaintiff wished to resolve the matter amicably,
"[h]owever, if [the defendant] persist[s] in the continuous harassment of [the plaintiff, . . . he]
will no longer employ a mere defensive strategy in dealing with this dispute." Attached was a
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* A California man who successfully opposed a proposed incinera-
tor project in his neighborhood was hit with a $42 million SLAPP.'5
* A League of Women Voters branch in California, which wrote a
letter to the editor criticizing a proposed condominium project and
supporting a voter initiative to stop it, was SLAPPed with a $63 mil-
lion libel suit.'6
* A New York man who petitioned a judge to rule on a town plan-
ning board's approval of a proposed townhouse project because of
concerns about inadequate studies on the impact on the water supply,
sewage disposal, roads, and schools, was sued by the developer for
$64 million.'7
Some SLAPPs arise as counterclaims or cross claims, filed in re-
sponse to the target's initiation of law-reform or government-chal-
lenge lawsuits.'" In most SLAPP suits, however, the filer is the
plaintiff, and the defendant a person who had no intention of becom-
ing involved in litigation.' 9 More than 1800 private citizens and groups
have been SLAPPed2° in suits demanding an average of $9 million in
damages.2' These suits took an average of thirty-six months to re-
solve,22 but in the end more than two-thirds of the SLAPP targets
prevailed in court.Y
draft complaint that was later filed in circuit court in Wakulla County, Florida. The court
dismissed case No. 91-44 with prejudice on May 17, 1991, for failure to state a cause of action
(letter, complaint, motions, and order on file with the Fla. Att'y Gen's Office).
15. See Putting a Stop to Unfair Suits, S.F. CanoN., Oct. 9, 1991, at A16 (editorial). In this
case, the defendant was able to find lawyers who defended him for free, avoiding the price of
prevailing in that SLAPP: $23,000 in attorney's fees.
16. Okun v. Superior Court, 629 P.2d 1369 (Cal. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Maple Prop-
erties v. Superior Court, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981). See also Robert Boyle, Activists at Risk of Being
SLAPPed, Spoai's ILLuSmRATED, Mar. 25, 1991, at 6; Putting a Stop to Unfair Suits, supra note
15.
17. See Boyle, supra note 16. This suit also targeted the citizen's group, naming the group's
president, vice president, and multiple John and Jane Does. It eventually was dropped. Id.
18. Pring, supra note 4, at 8 n.10. See also Note, Counterclaim and Countersuit Harassment
of Private Environmental Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its Implications, and Proposed Solutions, 74
MICH. L. REv. 106 (1975).
19. Note, supra note 18. Throughout this Comment, the terms "filer" and "target" will he
used uniformly to denominate the "instigators" and "victims" often identified by the media.
20. Canan, supra note 1, at 25. The suits identified by Canan and Pring involved people who
spoke out to governmental agencies or officials about new economic ventures, governmental li-
censing or permitting processes, or about the performance of a public servant. Id.
21. Id. at 26.
22. Id. Although the average suit is resolved in three years, it could continue longer if the
SLAPPed defendant chooses to fight back. One SLAPP in California lasted nine years. After the
original libel suit was dismissed, the defendants countersued for malicious prosecution and won
an $11.1 million award. See Philip Hager, Appeal of Milestone Damages Case Fails, L.A. TnEas,
Oct. 4, 1991, at A3.
23. Canan, supra note 1, at 26.
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B. Why Are SLAPPs Filed?
Generally, it will not be obvious from the face of the pleadings
whether a suit is truly a SLAPP because it is the motives behind the
filing of the suit that determine its character. University of Denver
Sociology Professor Penelope Canan has identified four categories of
motivating factors for SLAPP filings:
1. the intent to retaliate for successful opposition on an issue of
public interest;
2. the attempt to prevent expected future, competent opposition
on subsequent public policy issues;
3. the intent to intimidate and, generally, to send a message that
opposition will be punished; and
4. a view of litigation and the use of the court system as simply
another tool in a strategy to win a political and/or economic battle. 24
SLAPPs are a phenomenon stemming from a citizenry accustomed
to running to the judicial system every time a dispute cannot be easily
and immediately resolved. The filing of SLAPPs to quell opposition is
justified, some say, because citizen activism can ruin businesses. 25
However, the costs that are monumental for a target are likely an af-
fordable business expense for a corporation. And, the threat of mul-
timillion-dollar judgments presents an intolerable financial risk to
private citizens and grass-roots groups, who become cautious or even
silent.2 SLAPP filers seek-through intimidation-to stifle legitimate
political expression.27
C. "Desire To Intimidate" Cannot Be Pled:
How Are SLAPPs Filed?
Notwithstanding any underlying motivations, SLAPPs almost with-
out exception have some basis in law, however de minimis. They do
24. Id. at 30.
25. Fried, supra note 12. A lobbyist for a state building association concluded that many
SLAPPs are filed by small developers who have the approval of officials and most of the commu-
nity, but who are held up by a small group of activist opponents whose opposition threatens the
developers' financial futures. Id. See generally Brooks, supra note II. While in some cases the
citizen-activists themselves are guilty of abusing or manipulating the governmental petition proc-
ess to achieve personal goals, an analysis of that problem and its remedies is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
26. Environmental Lawsuits: Citizens SLAPP Back, GRaENwuta, June 18, 1991.
27. See Robert Abrams, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), 7 PACE
EN VTL. L. REv. 33 (1989) (Attorney General of New York State's address presented during Strate-
gic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs)-Protecting Property or Intimidating Citi-
zens, the Fall 1989 Colloquium of the Pace University School of Law's Center for Environmental
Legal Studies, Oct. 14, 1989).
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not come neatly packaged and identified as retaliatory suits, but are
disguised as a variety of claims. Examples include tortious interfer-
ence with business or contract,28 libel, slander, or defamation, civil
conspiracy or abuse of process," abuse of property rights and reputa-
tion,30 disparagement," interference with economic advantage, 2 or a
combination of these.33 It is often difficult to determine whether a suit
is actually a SLAPP, especially during the preliminary stages of litiga-
tion, when a well-pleaded SLAPP complaint is "well-protected
against allegations that the suit is frivolous." '34
D. What Provokes the Filing or Threat of a SLAPP?
The defendant is charged, among other things, with the following
acts of malice: She organized. She agitated. She distributed fliers.
She knocked on her neighbors' doors and requested their support in
a campaign to stop developers from squeezing two houses onto a lot
where there used to be one. It gets worse. She collected petitions.
According to the $6.6 million suit filed by the developer, Terra
Homes, the defendant even "made telephone calls to various
agencies of the Town of Hempstead.""
Many SLAPPs identified by Canan and University of Denver Law
Professor George Pring were sparked by activities generally consid-
ered protected under the Petition Clause of the United States Consti-
tution,36 such as proposing a building moratorium at a public
meeting,3 7 speaking out in public hearings,3" telephoning public
28. See City Strikes at Environmental Delay, ENGINEERING NEws-Rac., Jan. 20, 1992, at 15.
29. See Pring, supra note 4, at 9.
30. See Shaman, supra note 13.
31. See Katherine Long, Slander or Just a SLAPP? Developer Sues His Critic-Repeated
Allegations About Hillside Project To Culminate in Court, SFArrLE Tn.ss, Nov. 14, 1991, at C3.
32. See Karl Olson & Erin Daly, A Slap at SLAPP Suits Is a Signature Away, REcoaDar,
Oct. 7, 1991, at 6.
33. See Pring, supra note 4, at 8-9.
34. Ralph Stein, SLAPP Suits: A Slap at the First Amendment, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 45,
52 n.15 (1989).
35. See Paul Vitello, And Then There Was Just One, NEWSDAY, Mar. 1, 1992, at 6.
36. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
The citizens of most states also have this right under their state constitutions. See, e.g. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 5; CAL. CONSI., art. I, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.Y. CONsr. art. 1, §9.
37. See Greg Braxton, Builder's Suit Mires Activist in Court Fight, L.A. Trams, July 15,
1991, at B3.
38. See Fried, supra note 12.
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officials,3 9 testifying before commissions," ° or lobbying for legisla-
tion .4 Apparent SLAPPs also have been filed for writing letters to the
editor, 42 distributing fliers, 43 and sending a fund-raising letter. 44
E. Effects of a SLAPP: If the Targets Win, What's the Problem?
Although filers generally do not win SLAPP suits, the final verdict
may not be indicative of the real winner. Even before the suit is filed,
the mere threat of multimillion-dollar litigation can deter public par-
ticipation, especially if targets are unfamiliar with the legal process.
For many, the desire to oppose the clearing of a scenic wooded area
for a strip mall does not survive the threat of a lawsuit. This fear
makes it far less likely that a citizen activist will continue to speak out,
and, even if she persists, she may be more cautious with both words
and actions. 45 This intimidation factor also may keep others from
joining with the activist. In the event of an ongoing project, such as
an airport expansion, an early show of force likely will quell later op-
position.
There are tremendous financial costs involved once a SLAPP is
filed. The defense of a simple libel action, without even taking into
account the possibility of an unfavorable judgment, can cost more
than $20,000.46 The suit can bring opposition to a grinding halt simply
by tying up vital resources. Targets can face bankruptcy, loss of
credit, and foreclosure as they attempt to deal with mounting attor-
ney's fees for the legal assistance they need, no matter how frivolous
the suit. 47 Costs also involve more than dollars, as a lawsuit can sap
time and energy, causing stress and inconvenience. It is not surprising
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Said Deep, Public Officials Try To Silence Critics with a SLAPP, DETROIT NEWS,
June 8, 1992.
42. See Braxton, supra note 37.
43. See Fried, supra note 12.
44. See Andrew Blum, SLAPP Suits Continue in High Gear, NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1992, at
3.
45. Although SLAPP targets and filers are of both sexes, feminine pronouns will be used
throughout this Comment.
46. See Jones, supra note 7. at D8. Notwithstanding the availability of defense money for a
SLAPP, neither an individual nor an organization would consider money spent defending a frivo-
lous, unwarranted lawsuit well-spent. However, some individuals can find partial relief through
homeowner's insurance policies. See Shaman, supra note 13.
47. A woman who wrote a letter to a newspaper opposing the sale of dogs from animal
shelters to research firms was sued for libel. She was on the verge of losing her home until the
$300,000 judgment against her was settled for $15,000. This seems to suggest the judgment was
inflated and the recovery of money was not the purpose of the suit. See Sam Atwood, Activists
Pay Price for Speaking Out, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 1990, at 10A.
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that some targets abandon their principles to dispose of a suit-agree-
ing to a financial settlement, to refrain from further opposition, or
both.
However, the worst effects of SLAPPs are their social costs. Al-
though they are not yet filed in epidemic proportions, SLAPPs are
not geographically isolated4s and play a part in court overcrowding
nationwide. This affects not only people waiting to have legitimate
grievances heard in court, but taxpayers in general. Also, SLAPPs de-
feat the intent of many recent environmental laws which are geared,
through notices and hearings, to public participation and comment.49
They make a mockery of the judicial system by using it to bully un-
wanted opposition. And SLAPPs interfere with the democratic proc-
ess by chilling debate on public and political issues. Public
participation decreases as people who might otherwise make impor-
tant points and raise valid concerns remain silent. Organizations in-
volved in SLAPPs have seen membership and participation drop to
the point where the organizations nearly disband. 0 Even after a suit is
resolved, people may be reluctant to become involved again; there-
fore, the ripple effect of one SLAPP can place a severe limitation on
public debate and the free flow of information.
Although it may be obvious to the respondents that a particular suit
is a SLAPP, that usually is not easy for courts to determine conclu-
sively. This causes much of the problem. Until now, very few courts
have identified suits as SLAPPs in published opinions,' which is at
least in part because many are dismissed due to lack of prosecution.
However, one court has acknowledged that "the mere pendency of
the action [brought as a result of privileged petitioning activity] will
threaten the petitioners' free exercise of their right to petition the
48. Canan and Pring have found SLAPPs in every state and in the District of Columbia.
Pring, supra note 4, at 7 n.6.
49. Congress expressly provided for citizen enforcement of environmental regulations in the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1970), and the Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-65 (Supp. 111, 1973). See Note, supra note 18, at 106 n.7. Also, most state and
local laws relating to zoning and land use explicitly provide for public participation. Abrams,
supra note 27, at 34. Most state and federal land use laws seek to maximize discussion with public
notices and hearings. Fried, supra note 12.
50. See Stein, supra note 34, at 53. In one typical example, a California homeowner's associ-
ation successfully pushed for a referendum resulting in a one-year moratorium on hillside devel-
opment. A developer sued for $40 million, alleging distribution of a defamatory flier before the
election. Within one year membership in the association fell from 550 to 100, and by the second
year of the suit only 25 members remained. The rest had disassociated themselves for fear that
mere membership would expose them to liability. The suit was eventually dismissed for lack of
prosecution and one of the targets recovered $260,000. See Boyle, supra note 16, at 6.
51. See, e.g. Westfield Partners v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 524-25 (N.D. I11. 1990); Gor-
don v. Marrone, 573 N.Y.S. 2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
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government ... ."5 Therefore, once a SLAPP has been filed, regard-
less of whether prosecution of the suit has begun, an unjustly accused
target needs a way to fight back. At the same time, people or corpora-
tions with legitimate grievances must not be denied access to the
courts.
II. REMEDIES FOR INDivmuAL SLAPPED DEFENDANTS
A. Early Dismissal and/or Sanctions on Filer and Attorney
Once a SLAPP has been filed, prompt dismissal of the suit can
minimize its negative impact on the target by allowing her to immedi-
ately return to her pre-suit activities. However, current remedies for
early dismissal cannot address the specific problem of SLAPPs. At-
tempts to achieve early dismissal in federal court for failure to state a
cause of action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," or in a
Florida court under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 generally
would not be successful because SLAPPs contain a legally cognizable
claim, even if that claim was not the true basis for filing the suit.
Likewise, a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,1" which
also provides for accelerated dismissal of nonmeritorious claims,
would fail for the same reason. Absent a foolproof method of looking
beyond the pleadings to identify SLAPPs without erroneously mis-
classifying legitimate suits, targets must rely on other remedies.
Targets might be tempted to seek sanctions against the filers and
their attorneys under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.16 While this
52. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 34 (W. Va. 1981). A coal company sued a nonprofit
corporation for defamation after statements in the defendant's newsletter about the environmen-
tal impact of the plaintiff's mining activities. The defendant sought a writ of prohibition to pre-
vent the action from proceeding, claiming protection under the Petition Clause and the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. In granting the writ, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated:
[W]e shudder to think of the chill our ruling would have on the exercise of the freedom
of speech and the right to petition were we to allow this lawsuit to proceed .... To
prohibit robust debate on [questions of public concern] would deprive society of the
benefit of its collective thinking and, in the process, destroy the free exchange of ideas
which is the adhesive of our democracy.
Id. at 43.
53. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
54. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6).
55. FED. R. Cr. P. 56.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 1I. Rule 11 provides in relevant part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
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often-used disciplinary measure superficially seems tailor-made to ad-
dress SLAPPs, the apparently legitimate tort claims under which they
are filed could shield both the filer and attorney from liability. So-
phisticated filers also might be able to'conceal improper motives from
their attorneys in order to proceed with the suit. Additionally, sanc-
tion awards in most jurisdictions are limited by statute and would not
pose an obstacle to SLAPP filers with deep pockets."
Rule 3.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,5" and
Rule 4-3.1 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 9 also address the
filing of frivolous suits. The comment to each of these rules defines an
action as frivolous:
if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose
of harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is
unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the
action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.6
This definition aptly describes SLAPPs. Again, however, the burden
of proving that the primary purpose is harassment can be an onerous
one, especially because clients might not be candid with their lawyers
about underlying, improper motives for the suit.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules Reg-
ulating the Florida Bar neither have the force of law nor reach beyond
the lawyer.6' Unless there is a longstanding business relationship be-
tween the lawyer and the client, most clients have little reason to care
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation.
Id.
57. See Stein, supra note 34, at 58.
58. MODEL RuLrs OF PRoFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1992). Rule 3.1 provides that:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or asset or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for
the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could
result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the case be established.
Id.
59. RtLEs REoULATmo Tm FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-3.1 (1991). The text of this rule is identical
to Rule 3.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 58.
60. MODEL RUas OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. (1992); RU.ES REGULATING THE
FLoRIMA BAR Rule 4-3.1 cmt. (1991).
61. But see FED. R. Civ. P. 1l.
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if their lawyer is disciplined or sanctioned. Because the goals of true
SLAPPs-intimidation and harassment-are often achieved regard-
less of the outcome of a lawsuit, sanctions against the filing attorneys
or a reversal due to attorney misconduct has little practical affect.
In Florida, the prevailing party in a civil suit may recover fees in
limited circumstances. Under section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes,
courts have discretion to award fees and costs if the court finds "a
complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by
the complaint or defense of the losing party."6 2 This also is a close-to-
impossible burden of proof when a SLAPP masquerades as a tort
claim.
B. Countersuit: The SLA PP-Back!
Perhaps the most aggressive remedy for a defendant who has been
SLAPPed is to fight back with either a counterclaim or a subsequent
lawsuit. Pring views these SLAPP-backs as the most effective long-
range tool for discouraging SLAPPs.63 However, while some victims
of SLAPP suits have won large jury verdicts,6 choosing to fight back
in court may not be a realistic option for targets whose financial and
emotional resources have been exhausted by the initial suit.
Should a target choose to continue the dispute in court, there are
often alternative causes of action that can be raised. Malicious prose-
cution, abuse of process,65 or conspiring to violate the constitutional
right to free speech 6 are usually viable possibilities. The claim alleged
in the SLAPP-back would depend on the timetable and resources of
the target, as well as state law. In Florida, for example, a malicious
prosecution suit may not be filed until the original defendant has won
the suit in question, 67 although a target may counterclaim during that
62. FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1991).
63. Pring, supra note 4. at 19.
64. See id. at 19-20 nn.57-59 and accompanying text.
In Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co., 264 Cal. Rptr. 883, 892 (Cal. App. 1989), rev. denied, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 883, cert. denied, 11I S. Ct. 293 (1990), the target fought back after Shell Oil Company
filed an alleged SLAPP suit claiming trade libel against a plumbers' union attorney. The attorney
had reported to state health officials that Shell's pipe resin contained an allegedly cancer-causing
ingredient. The total award for attorney's fees, compensatory and punitive damages was $5.197
million. The decision was appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case.
65. See Abuse of Dolphins, supra note 6, at 29.
66. See Paul Duggan, Dueling P.G. Suits Dumped, WAsH. PosT, Mar. 30, 1992, at D3.
67. See Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1986); Jones v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 578 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), cited in Paul Amundsen & Darren A.
Schwartz, "SLAPP" Suits: An Assault on the Right To Petition the Government, FLA. B.J.,
Mar. 1992, at 51.
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suit for abuse of process.M Another potential drawback of an action
for malicious prosecution is that the instigator of the suit may be im-
munized; at least one Florida case has held that reliance on the advice
of counsel provides an absolute defense.69 Furthermore, a target who
originally had no intention of being involved in litigation might balk
at spending more money in an attempt to vindicate herself, however
frivolous the original claim.
Any litigation is costly and time-consuming and, because of the ap-
parent validity of the initial suits, SLAPP-backs are difficult to win.
Knowing that the initial suit was a SLAPP does not guarantee that the
target will win a SLAPP-back, nor does prevailing in the alleged
SLAPP. Often, SLAPP suits are "won" by targets simply due to the
filer's non-prosecution or withdrawal of the suit.70 While winning
SLAPP-back suits will provide a certain amount of satisfaction to tar-
gets who choose to file countersuits, systemwide remedies are needed
to deal effectively with the problem.
III. SYSTEMWIDE REMEDIES AGAINST SLAPPs
A. Heightened A wareness of SLAPPs
Judges, lawyers, and the general public must know what SLAPPs
are and why the suits are filed in order to address the problem effec-
tively. Judges and attorneys should be educated about the phenome-
non at state and federal forums, with emphasis on ferreting out
SLAPPs for prompt dismissal or accelerated trial dates.7' At least one
law school has held a conference on SLAPPs, 72 and bar journals na-
tionwide have published articles on the phenomenon. 3 This exposure
68. See Blue v. Weinstein, 381 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), cited in Amundsen &
Schwartz, supra note 67, at 53.
69. See Royal Trust Bank, N.A. v. Von Zamft, 511 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), rev.
denied, 520 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1988).
70. Stein, supra note 34, at 57.
71. Although this would not eliminate the problem of SLAPP suits, it would limit the nega-
tive effects. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
72. See generally Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs)-Protecting
Property or Intimidating Citizens, 7 PACE ENVrL. L. Rav. 1 (1989) (addressing SLAPP lawsuits at
the Fall Colloquium of Pace University School of Law's Center for Environmental Legal Studies).
73. See, e.g. Political Intimidation Suits: SLAPP Defendant Slaps Back, 4 BNA CiV. TtRAL
MANuAL 459 (1988); Abuse of Dolphins, supra note 6; Amundsen & Schwartz, supra note 67;
Gerisse Anderson, Court Assesses $10,000 Costs in SLAPP Suit, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16, 1992, at I;
Carole Bass, Parking Ruling Adds Another Slap to Intimidation-Suit Claims, CT. L. TRm., Aug.
19, 1991, at 5; Blum, supra note 44; Ronald J. Fleury, Gadflies Gain New Ground in Fending Off
Libel Suits, N.J. L.J., Jan. 13, 1992, at 1.
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has by no means been limited to the legal profession, as articles about
SLAPPs have appeared in the journals of several other professions as
well.74 The general public has become more aware of these types of
suits, as numerous articles have appeared in the nation's major news-
papers and magazines within the past two years.7" SLAPPs have even
been the topic of discussion on episodes of 20/20,76 the MacNeil/Leh-
rer News Hour,7 and L.A. Law.78 Also, New York activists formed a
Citizens Legal Defense Fund to provide financial assistance to SLAPP
targets .79
As the general public becomes more aware of its rights, SLAPPs
will become less intimidating, and thus less effective. The increase in
publicity surrounding SLAPPs also might make filers less hasty in us-
ing a lawsuit as an intimidation tactic. However, publicity alone is not
an adequate remedy. At least one state court has addressed the prob-
lem.
B. Judicial Remedies
The Supreme Court of Colorado, when faced in 1984 with a
SLAPP suit, adopted a "sham" exception that called for heightened
74. See, e.g. Tobi Lippin, Uncivil Suits; Strategic Lawsuits Against Political Participation
Trends, 94 MASS. TECH. REv., Apr. 1991, at 14; City Strikes at Environmental Delay, supra note
28; Furrier Sues Activist, FuR AoE WKLY., Feb. 12, 1990, at 6; Leigh, supra note 9; Nemes, supra
note 8; Skip Tate, Zoning by Intimidation Growing National Trend, CiNCINNATI Bus. COURIER,
Mar. 12, 1990, at 16.
75. See, e.g. Michael Alexander, Activist's Trial Ends; Judge Dismisses Builder's Libel
Charge, Countersuit, NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 1992, at 7; Atwood, supra note 47; Boyle, supra note
16; Cutting Down on Intimidation; Permitting Legitimate Litigation To Proceed- Without Deny-
ing Rights, L.A. Trsws, Mar. 10, 1992, at B6 (editorial); Paul Duggan, Bowie Activist Returns
Fire by Suing Developer, WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 1991, at CS; Pamela Ferdinand, SLAPPed into
Silence, Mtsaw HERALD, May 25, 1992, at IA; Ross Gelbspan, Worcester Sues Group Questioning
Airport Plan, BOSTON GionE, Jan. 7, 1992, at 15; Lisa Gibbs, Activists Get SLAPPed Around;
Companies in Florida Turn to Something Called Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,
MAMw R v., tiec. 6,1990, at 1; Open Debate SLAPPs Shut, ATLAMTA J. & CONsT., Dec. 3, 1991,
at A20 (editorial); Shaman, supra note 13; Stephanie Simon, Nader Suits Up To Strike Back
Against 'Slapps', WALL ST. J., July 9, 1991, at BI; SLAPP Suits, ANnmAS' AGENDA, Dec. 1991,
at 36; Bill Turque, SLAPPing the Opposition, NEwswEEK, Mar. 5, 1990, at 22; Jason Zweig, A
SLAPP in the Face, FoRBEs, May 29, 1989.
76. Slapped Into Silence (ABC television broadcast, May 25, 1990), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, OMNI file.
77. Getting SLAPPed (PBS television broadcast, NEWS Hout, Feb. 19, 1990, transcript
#3671), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI file.
78. See Lisa Gibbs, Getting SLAPPed Around; These Suits Are Aimed at Quieting Critics,
LEGAL Tnms, Dec. 24, 1990, at 10 ("discussion of SLAPPs has even turned up this season on the
television series 'L.A. Law').
79. Abrams, supra note 27, at 43. Although New York State Attorney General Abrams
lauded this group, such a fund serves merely as a bandage on a wound that never should have
existed.
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scrutiny of suits jeopardizing the rights protected by the Petition
Clause. In Protect Our Mountain Environment v. District Court,1° an
environmental group, known as POME, filed an action in a county
court seeking to overturn an approval of a developer's application by
the county commission.8 After POME lost both the initial decision
and an appeal, the developer filed a claim against POME for abuse of
process and civil conspiracy. 2 POME's motion to dismiss based on
the Petition Clause was summarily denied, and POME appealed to the
state supreme court. In ruling that the motion should not have been
summarily denied, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted a new stan-
dard for cases involving the Petition Clause.S3
This standard applies when a defendant iS sued for abuse of the
administrative or judicial processes of the government and subse-
quently files a motion to dismiss based on the constitutional right to
petition 4 To survive the motion, the plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant's actions were not immunized from liability under the Peti-
tion Clause of the First Amendment because:
1. the defendant's administrative or judicial claims were devoid
of reasonable factual support, or, if so supportable, lacked any
cognizable basis in law for their assertion; and
2. the primary purpose of the defendant's petitioning activity
was to harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some other improper
objective; and
3. the defendant's petitioning activity had the capacity to
adversely affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.8'
This test is based on U.S. Supreme Court precedents." The Colo-
rado Supreme Court apparently believed it would adequately address
the constitutional needs of both plaintiffs and defendants in this situa-
tion. However, it can only protect a specific category of SLAPP tar-
gets in a limited way. The court's "solution" is incomplete as it offers
no real financial disincentives to filers, and does not provide for the
award of attorney's fees or damages in a case failing the POME test.
80. 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
81. Id. at 1363.
82. Id. at 1364.
83. Id. at 1370.
84. This standard would not apply in a case such as that discussed supra note 47, where a
citizen was sued based on the contents of a letter to the editor.
85. Protect Our Mountain Env't v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Colo. 1984) (empha-
sis added).
86. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern Rail Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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No other state has yet adopted the POME test,8 7 but many have cho-
sen to attack the problem legislatively.
C. Legislative Attempts To Deal with SLAPP Suits
Anti-SLAPP legislation has been proposed in several states over the
past few years, including California, Florida, New Jersey, New York,
Maryland, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Of
course, anti-SLAPP legislation cannot completely prohibit the filing
of certain types of suits because the federal, as well as most state con-
stitutions, guarantee access to the courts for redress of injury." And,
in the case of SLAPPs, there generally is an injury of some sort that,
at least superficially, validates the filing. 9 Therefore, instead of at-
tempting to impose a blanket prohibition on certain types of claims,
the proposed legislation has either attempted to define protected con-
duct and the situations in which targets can recover damages, or has
provided guidelines for dismissal of certain claims. While all of the
proposed legislation is aimed at hindering intimidation lawsuits, the
bills have neither been uniformly drafted nor uniformly accepted. Be-
fore the 1992 legislative sessions, only the State of Washington had
enacted a law specifically aimed at curbing SLAPPs.9
1. Limited Civil Immunity for Certain Types of Public
Participation
a. Washington: The Earliest Response to a SLAPP
The Washington Legislature enacted sections 4.24.500-.520 of the
Revised Code of Washington in 1989.91 The original bill 92 was intro-
duced at the request of Governor Booth Gardner and Attorney Gen-
eral Kenneth 0. Eikenberry in direct response to a widely publicized
87. The Florida Attorney General urged the adoption of this standard in an amicus curiae
brief filed with the Florida Supreme Court in Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc. See infra notes 222-
27 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 36.
89. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
90. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500-520 (1991).
91. 1989 Wash. Laws 234, codified at WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 4.24.500-520 (1991).
92. Wash. HB 1254 (1989).
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retaliation suit.91 That alleged SLAPP suit was filed by a real estate
developer against a married couple who had reported his tax viola-
tions to a state agency. When the agency took enforcement action
against the developer, he sued the couple for slander and libel, even
though the information they reported was factual. 94 The Washington
Legislature quickly responded with the first law directed specifically at
curbing SLAPPs. 91
The Legislature intended to "protect individuals who make good-
faith reports to appropriate governmental bodies." 96 The law provides
that "[a] person who in good faith communicates a complaint or in-
formation to any agency of federal, state, or local government regard-
ing any matter reasonably of concern to that agency shall be immune
from civil liability on claims based upon the communication to the
agency." 9 7 This language addresses the majority of the situations in
which SLAPPs arise, and should provide potential targets with some
assurance that they can speak without being sued.98
Prevailing parties under the law are entitled to recover costs and
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in establishing the defense. 99
93. Robert John Real Estate Co. v. Hill, No. 87-2-01696-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. filed July 14,
1987), cited in Pring, supra note 4, at 15 n.43; 1989 Wash. Laws 234 (Governor's explanation of
partial veto). At least two other states, Florida and Texas, also have proposed legislation based on
particular constituent complaints. Telephone Interview with Scott Hochberg, Legislative Aide to
then Texas Rep. Paul Colbert, Dem., Houston, (June 16, 1992); Telephone Interview with Eileen
Patrick, aide to then Fla. Sen. Sherry Walker, Dem., Waukeenah, (May 13, 1992).
94. 1989 Wash. Laws 234 (Governor's explanation of partial veto).
95. The lawsuit was filed in 1987 and the resulting law was enacted in 1989. See supra text
accompanying note 93.
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.500 (1991).
97. Id. § 4.24.510.
98. The Legislature intended to provide additional protection for SLAPP targets with the
following section, which was vetoed by the Governor:
If an agency fails to reasonably respond to a person who in good faith communicates a
complaint or information to any agency of federal, state, or local government regard-
ing any matter reasonably of concern to that agency, the person shall be immune from
civil liability on claims arising from the communications of such complaint or informa-
tion which the person genuinely and reasonably believed to be true. A person prevailing
upon the defense provided for in this section shall be entitled to recover costs and rea-
sonable attorneys' fees incurred in establishing the defense.
1989 Wash. Laws 234 § 3.
In his explanation of the partial veto, the Governor expressed concern that the section could be
interpreted as conferring immunity even for statements that extended beyond the original commu-
nication to the agency, such as inferences made about the character of an individual. See 1989
Wash. Laws 234 (Governor's explanation of partial veto). However, the Legislature's apparent
intent was to immunize citizens who made reports to an agency that did not follow up on those
reports, either due to lack of resources or a belief that the reports did not merit investigation. See
1989 Wash. Laws 234, new section, §3.
99. WASH. REv. CoDa § 4.24.510(1991).
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However, targets might be unable to avoid the initial outlay of funds
to pay an attorney's retainer and court costs. Also, in the event of an
appeal, reimbursement from the filer might be held up for months or
years. 10
The last part of the law, section 4.25.520, provides for state-funded
legal assistance. 10' Agencies receiving complaints or information under
the previous section may intervene in and defend against any suit pre-
cipitated by the communication to the agency; and should the agency
decide not to intervene, the state attorney general may do so.'0 2 If the
agency proves the defense, it is entitled to collect costs and reasonable
attorney's fees; but if it is not successful the agency is liable for the
opposing party's costs and fees incurred in proving the defense inap-
plicable or invalid. 03
The bill obviously was enacted too late to help the original targets
of the Washington suit. And it is impossible to determine the law's
effect as it has not yet been tested in court.1 4 Doubtless, however, it
will merely be the first in a long line of anti-SLAPP laws, as many
other states are considering similar measures.
b. California: Try, Try Again
The California Legislature began consideration of anti-SLAPP bills
in 1990. Senate Bill 2313, introduced by Senator Bill Lockyer, 05
would have completely barred the filing of suits involving certain First
Amendment activities unless they met a delineated pre-filing standard
of proof. The bill passed, but was vetoed by then-Governor George
Duekmejian.
In 1991 Senator Lockyer again attempted to address the problem of
SLAPPs with Senate Bill 341,101 part of which was essentially a more-
easily-understood version of his 1990 bill. This improved bill passed
the Senate unanimously, and passed the California Assembly 54-20. It
was also vetoed, this time by Governor Pete Wilson, who apparently
wanted a lower evidentiary standard for continuing the suit. Similarly,
100. See supra note 22.
101. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.520 (West Supp. 1992). The likely rationale for this pro-
vision is the state's interest in continued citizen involvement in matters of public importance, as
well as a tacit recognition of the intimidation felt by the average citizen when sued.
102. Id.
103, Id.
104. Washington Revised Code, 1992 cumulative annual pocket part, does not list any cases
under these statutory sections. Furthermore, no cases citing these statutory sections were found
using LEXIS and Westlaw identifiers on October 23, 1992.
105. Dem., Hayward.
106. The bill also would have removed the sunset dates of three existing provisions in Califor-
SILENCING SLAPPs
the California Builders Association and a Loyola Law School profes-
sor expressed concern that the bill as drafted would unfairly limit de-
velopers' free access to the courts. Lockyer, however, found no
problem with "kind of purposefully tilting toward protection of First
Amendment rights," and reintroduced an identical bill, Senate Bill
1264, in the 1992 session. An amended version of this bill was signed
by Governor Wilson on September 16, 1992.
The 1992 Lockyer bill contained a legislative intent section, which
acknowledged the problem of SLAPP suits, albeit not by name, and
addressed causes of action arising from acts "in furtherance of [a]
person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or
California Constitution."'17
The most important distinction was the removal of the "pleading
hurdle." Under the 1990 bill, a plaintiff would have been prevented
from filing the action containing the alleged SLAPP until after she
had "established that there is a substantial probability that ... [she
would] prevail on the claim.1 '' m This section raised constitutional con-
cerns because it could have, in effect, barred certain claims from ever
reaching court. 109 The 1992 version permitted the initial filing of such
claims, but provided that they "shall be subject to a motion to strike,
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there
is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim." 0 The bill also contained timetables for hearing of the mo-
tions, and provided for stays of discovery proceedings until such
nia law, thus extending the effective dates of these substantive provisions indefinitely. See Cal. SB
341 (1991). In 1991, Assemblywoman Gwen Moore, Democrat, Los Angeles, introduced Assem-
bly Bill 440, which was similar to Lockyer's bill, but addressed only suits filed against homeown-
er's associations. Like the 1990 Lockyer bill, a plaintiff would have to prove merit before filing
suit against a homeowner's association. Moore's bill, which also passed both houses and was
vetoed by Governor Wilson, was refiled in 1992 as Assembly Bill 2828.
107. Such acts were defined as including
any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by
a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any official proceeding authorized by law;
or any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.
Cal. SB 1264 (1992). This expansive language should adequately address most types of intimida-
tion suits.
108. Cal. SB 2313, at 2 (1990).
109. See Assembly Subcommittee on the Administration of Justice, Report on SB 341, com-
ments by the California State Bar's Committee on the Administration of Justice, at 4 [hereinafter
Hearing Report on SB 341].
110. Cal. SB 1264, at 5 (1992). Defendants prevailing under a motion to strike are entitled to
recover attorney's fees and costs. However, if the motion is found to be frivolous or solely inter-
posed to cause delay, the plaintiff may recover attorney's fees and costs. Id.
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motions would be decided. Relieving the targets of the potential finan-
cial burden of discovery is a good idea; however, the bill lacked any
great financial disincentive to filers, as there was no provision for
awards of compensatory or punitive damages to persons targeted with
SLAPP suits.
The basic difference between the two bills is that although the same
"heightened scrutiny""' is applied, the later version allows filing be-
fore meeting the heightened standard, while the earlier version did
not. From a practical standpoint, the 1990 bill was more favorable to
targets as it insulated them, to some extent, from the judicial process.
Under the later bill the target at least would have to hire counsel to
file the motion to strike, although upon prevailing she would be enti-
tled to recover attorney's fees and costs associated with the motion." 2
The heightened burden of "substantial probability" was problematic
for members of the Subcommittee on the Administration of Justice,
who suggested during the 1991 session that a more appropriate stan-
dard would be a "no reasonable and substantial basis for bringing the
cause of action" test."'
The 1992 bill also streamlined language outlining how the courts
would make the determination of probable success on the merits." 4
The bill stated that "[fn making its determination, the court shall
consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating
the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.""'
c. Connecticut: Giving Up So Soon?" 6
Connecticut also has seen multiple versions of anti-SLAPP bills,
with less persistence and success. Three bills dealing with SLAPPs
were proposed in 1991, but were neither raised in committee nor re-
filed in subsequent sessions." 7 Raised Bill 7374,118 filed by the Judici-
ary Committee, provided that:
111. Id. ("the plaintiff ... [must establish] that he or she will prevail on the claim").
112. Id.
113. Hearing Report on SB 341, supra note 109, at 4.
114. The 1990 bill read: "Ithe court may allow the filing of a pleading that includes that
claim following the filing of a verified petition therefor [sic] accompanied by the proposed plead-
ing and supporting affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability is based." Cal. SB 2313, at
2(1990).
115. Cal. SB 1264, at 5 (1992).
116. The General Statutes of Connecticut already contain a section entitled "[D]amages for
groundless or vexatious suit or defense." CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-568 (1987). This title is some-
what misleading, as the section applies only to suits in which there is want of probable cause for
either the filing or the defense. Id. Probable cause exists if reasonable people would be justified in
thinking there were reasonable grounds for commencing and prosecuting the original action. Id.
Therefore, harassment suits filed as legitimate tort claims would not be actionable under this
section. Anti-SLAPP legislation filed in 1991 would have changed that.
117. Two of the 1991 bills were quite vague. Senate Bill 161 would have amended section 52-
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[A]ny person who testifies or submits books, papers or other
evidence at a meeting of a public agency shall be immune from civil
liability for damage or injury resulting from such testimony or
evidence unless (1) such testimony or evidence constitutes defamation
of character, or (2) it is demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that such person's primary purpose in testifying or
submitting evidence was to cause unnecessary delay or otherwise
impede the agency's consideration of the matter before it to the
detriment of a party. ' 19
The language of this bill seems to have been carefully crafted to avoid
potential infringement on the rights of filers. Only very restricted
types of communications would~be protected, and a trial could still be
necessary to determine the motivation of the speaker and whether the
communication in question was protected or defamatory.
Section 2 of that bill provided that any person who, without proba-
ble cause, commenced and prosecuted any civil action because of an-
other person's use of rights guaranteed by the United States or
Connecticut Constitutions would be required to pay actual damages,
punitive damages, and reasonable attorney's fees.'2 The use of the
phrase "without probable cause" probably would immunize many
SLAPP filers. The bill also provides that persons filing actions "in
[their] own name or in the name of others"'' could be held liable
under the section, leaving open the question of whether filing attor-
neys would be liable as well as their clients.
Although the three bills introduced in Connecticut were not
"model" anti-SLAPP bills, the mere fact that they were introduced at
all suggests a need for such legislation in that state. Perhaps the Con-
necticut Legislature will choose to introduce an improved version,
modeled after legislation introduced in another state.
568 of the General Statutes of Connecticut to provide that filers of suits commenced and prose-
cuted in retaliation against the exercise of constitutionally protected rights shall pay damages,
including punitive damages. Conn. SB 161 (1991). No damages would have been awarded in the
case of suits which were filed but not prosecuted. Senate Bill 439 included the same flaw. It
provided only that "any person who commences and prosecutes a civil action primarily to intimi-
date, harass or retaliate against another person on account of such other person's participation in
proceedings before a public agency shall be liable for actual damages, treble punitive damages and
attorney's fees." Conn. SB 439 (1991) (emphasis added). Both of these bills failed to recognize
that the mere filing of SLAPPs might cause the desired result without any further action on the
part of the plaintiff.
118. Conn. Raised Bill 7374 (1991).
119. Id. at 1.
120. Id. The requirement of actual prosecution was repeated from another Connecticut bill.
121. Id. at 2.
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d. New Jersey: Extended Protection for Public Participants
The New Jersey Legislature has considered anti-SLAPP legislation
in three sessions. In 1990 identical anti-SLAPP bills were filed in both
the Assembly and the Senate. 2' The following year, an identical bill
passed the Senate but failed in the House. This anti-SLAPP bill,
which was refiled in the 1992 session,'1 served as a model for the
Florida bill, 24 discussed in Section IV.
Assembly Bill 190 (1992) identified the hazards associated with
SLAPP suits, albeit not by name, for both the government and tar-
gets. 2 Substantively, the bill provided that "a person who in good
faith communicates a complaint or information to any public entity
regarding any matter reasonably of colicern to that entity shall be im-
mune from liability for damages arising out of the communica-
tion, ' 1"' thus providing protection for a typical SLAPP target. The
bill also extended protection to public comments not necessarily made
directly to an agency, providing that "a person who in good faith and
without actual malice 27 expresses an opinion or belief concerning a
public issue which affects the person shall be immune from liability
for damages arising out of the communication."'I This language
would shield people whose letters to the editor might otherwise pro-
voke the filing of a SLAPP.'29 Furthermore, costs and attorney's fees
are awarded to persons prevailing under this defense.'"
The bill provided that a public entity that receives a complaint un-
der this section may intervene and defend against any suit for dam-
ages arising out of the communication to the public entity. Also, the
attorney general may intervene and defend against such suit if the
122. N.J. AB 4233 (1990); N.J. SB 3136 (1990).
123. N.J. AB 190 (1992).
124. See Fla. SB 2188 (1992); infra notes 190-222 and accompanying text.
125. Section 1 of Assembly Bill 190 stated in part that:
The Legislature finds and declares that information provided by citizens concerning
potential wrongdoing is vital to effective law enforcement and the efficient operation of
government. The threat of a civil action for damages can be a deterrent to citizens who
wish to report information to federal, state or local agencies or who wish to speak out
about a public issue that affects them.
Problems with this language, which was used in Florida Senate Bill 2188 (1992), are discussed
infra notes 192-224 and accompanying text.
126. N.J. AB 190, at 1 (1992).
127. In the Senate version that passed in January 1991, the words "and without actual mal-
ice" were deleted. See N.J. SB 3136 (first reprint), at i (1990).
128. N.J. AB 190, at I (1992).
129. See, e.g., supra note 47.
130. N.J. AB 190, at 1 (1992).
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public entity fails to do so. 3' Although this leaves the citizen who is
SLAPPed for writing a letter to the editor on her own financially, it
would provide for much-needed financial support in the most com-
mon incidents-retaliation for speaking out to a government agency-
and would protect the strong state interest in public input in its deci-
sion-making processes.
Unlike anti-SLAPP legislation in Washington, California, and Con-
necticut, Assembly Bill 190 also included a legislative definition. The
question of whether to place such legislative definitions into state law
rather than leaving them to judicial interpretation is difficult. The risk
of specifying the meaning of terms is that the definitions might be
manipulated by attorneys attempting to prove that suits that should be
treated as SLAPPs do not fit into the statutory definitions. 13 2 On the
other hand, not providing any legislative guidance could leave a state
with multiple interpretations of words or phrases until the matter is
resolved by the state's highest court. However, problems from legisla-
tive definitions are unlikely and the bill probably would be a good
deterrent to SLAPPs.
e. New York: Addressing Nonprosecution: SLAPPs That Are Not
Prosecuted Can Hurt Just As Much
New York has recently acknowledged a need for anti-SLAPP legis-
lation because "there is no existing effective remedy" for SLAPP tar-
gets in that state."' In the 1989-90 session Assemblyman Maurice
131. Id.
132. The term "public entity" is defined as "the federal government, the State of New Jersey,
and any county, municipality, district, public authority, public agency and any other political
subdivision or public body in the State." N.J. AB 190, at 1 (1992). Counterclaims are sometimes
filed against environmental plaintiffs who speak out or file suits with or against federal agencies
attempting to enforce federal environmental laws. See Note, supra note 18. One could argue that
the bill does not protect people making complaints to federal environmental agencies because,
while state agencies are specifically listed in the bill, federal agencies are not. Although such an
argument may seem trivial, anything that could extend a lawsuit would further a SLAPP filer's
goals.
Another problem might arise with interstate issues. The language of the bill restricts immunity
to complaints made to agencies located within the state. Although there currently is no proof of
the occurrence of interstate SLAPPs, they could occur. Arguably, a New Jersey resident who
traveled to New York to oppose an incinerator project would not be granted immunity, even if
sued in New Jersey, merely because of the geographic location of the public entity receiving the
complaint. This is true despite the potential negative effects the incinerator could have on resi-
dents of New Jersey.
133. New York State Assembly 1990 Committee Bill Memorandum on AB 11948, Section V
(unpaginated) [hereinafter Memorandum on AB 11948]. New York law currently provides for
recovery of costs for frivolous claims and counterclaims only in personal injury, injury to prop-
erty, or wrongful death actions--categories which do not exemplify typical SLAPPs. See NEw
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Hinchey134 introduced anti-SLAPP legislation. This bill, Assembly Bill
9744, did not pass and has not been reintroduced.135
Another anti-SLAPP bill, Assembly Bill 4299, finally passed upon
third consideration in 1992.136 Although directed generally at the prob-
lem of SLAPPs, this bill only addressed situations in which govern-
ment regulatory or permitting processes are involved. 37 It offered
both limited immunity and awards of damages to targets, and expe-
dited hearings for certain motions. 138
The New York Legislature found that the threat of damages "can
be and has been used as a means of harassing, intimidating or punish-
ing individuals . . . who have involved themselves in public af-
fairs."' 139 While not as forceful as the California language, these
findings are a good way of emphasizing that such suits will not be
looked on with favor in the state.
YORK Crv. PRxc. L. & R. 8303-a (McKinney 1992). Even if damages for SLAPPs could be recov-
ered under that section, sanctions are limited to $10,000-an inadequate limit given the far supe-
rior resources of most SLAPP filers. Malicious prosecution-sometimes an option in a SLAPP-
back-would not be effective against a SLAPP filed in New York because there a cause of action
arises only where there is some interference with a person, such as an arrest or injunction, or with
property, such as an attachment. See Belsky v. Lowenthal, 392 N.E. 2d 560 (N.Y. 1979) (cited in
Memorandum on AB 11948).
134. Dem., Saugerties.
135. Hinchey's bill provided for awards of costs and fees and possible punitive damages if an
action, cross-claim or counterclaim was found to be malicious, "based upon the circumstances of
the case." N.Y. AB 9744 (1990). A malicious action was defined as one:
commenced or continued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing or oth-
erwise inhibiting the prevailing party's free exercise of speech, petition, or association
rights with respect to an issue of public concern ... [and] . . . commenced or contin-
ued without a substantial basis in law or fact and could not be supported by a substan-
tial argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
Id. (emphasis added).
The bill has two positive aspects. First, it specifically emphasized the need to look beyond the
face of the pleadings to the "circumstances of the case." This is important because most often
SLAPPs are facially valid suits filed to achieve malicious purposes. True SLAPPs would likely
not withstand scrutiny that goes beyond the face of the pleadings. See supra notes 24-34 and
accompanying text.
Second, while the Connecticut bills required both commencement and prosecution of the frivo-
lous action, Hinchey's bill would have given courts discretion to award costs for frivolous com-
mencement or continuation of the suit, thus deterring plaintiffs from filing SLAPPs without any
intention to prosecute but who know that the suits may still have the desired effects.
136. N.Y. AB 4299 (1992). In 1990, the same bill was introduced as New York Assembly Bill
11948. The bill failed in 1990, and was reintroduced in 1991 as Assembly Bill 4299. This bill also
failed, and was carried over to the 1992 session. Assembly Bill 4299 passed the Assembly 140-0 on
February 3, 1992, passed the Senate 53-5 on July 1, 1992, and was signed by Governor Mario
Cuomo on August 3, 1992.
137. But not, for instance, the situation discussed supra note 47.
138. N.Y. AB 4299 (1992).
139. Id. at 1.
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Assembly Bill 4299 provided that defendants in harassment actions
may recover damages, including costs and attorney's fees, in three si-
tuations. First, costs and fees may be recovered if "the action involv-
ing public petition and participation was commenced or continued
without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported
by a substantial argument for the extension, modification or reversal
of existing law."'14 This language mirrors the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 14' and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.142
Second, damages may be recovered upon demonstration that "the
action involving public petition and participation was commenced or
continued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing or
otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of speech, petition or
association rights.' ' 43 This language, like that in the Hinchey bill,'-
offered excellent protection for targets by enabling them to recover
damages in suits that, although filed in good faith, were unnecessarily
prolonged to achieve other purposes. Realistically, even a filer who
began a suit with valid objectives could decide to drag it out longer
than necessary because of the added benefit of intimidation. It also
addresses the need to deter plaintiffs who file SLAPPs without any
intention to prosecute, in the hopes that the suits may still have the
desired effects.
Finally, the bill provided for recovery of punitive damages "upon
an additional demonstration that the action involving public petition
and participation was commenced or continued for the sole purpose
of harassing, intimidating, punishing or otherwise maliciously inhibit-
ing the free exercise of speech, petition or association rights.' ' 45
SLAPP suits virtually always have some basis in law and can quite
easily masquerade as valid suits.'l 6 Requiring defendants to prove ha-
rassment is the sole purpose for the lawsuit will be virtually impossible
in any case where the filing party has even the most obscure tort claim
or a chance of obtaining any financial recovery. Substituting the word
"primary" for "sole" would still protect good-faith plaintiffs against
liability for damages while providing a larger disincentive for SLAPP
filers. This new wording would offer a more realistic opportunity for
targets to recover substantial punitive damages. Nonetheless, even the
140. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
141. MODEL RuLEss OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1992).
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
143. N.Y. AB 4299, at 2 (1992) (emphasis added).
144. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
145. N.Y. AB 4299, at 2 (1992) (emphasis added).
146. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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burden of proving the primary purpose of filing was not that stated in
the pleadings would likely be difficult for most targets.
Assembly Bill 4299 also provided legislative definitions for four de-
bated terms: "action involving public petition and participation,"
"public applicant or permittee," "communication," and "govern-
ment body. 1' 47 This "laundry list" approach of defining relevant
terms renews issues discussed in conjunction with the New Jersey bill,
including the danger of over- or under-defining.'4
The bill also limited the plaintiff's right to recover damages in ac-
tions involving public petition and participation. Damages could be
awarded only if the filer establishes by "clear and convincing evidence
that any communication which gives rise to the action was made with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false, where the truth or falsity of such communication is material to
the cause of action at issue."' 4 9 This provision would shield persons
who testify in good faith at public hearings and provide information
that is later determined to be misleading.
The bill likewise raised the standard that must be met by the filer to
survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment in
cases involving public participation. In such cases, a motion to dismiss
shall be granted unless the responding party demonstrates that "the
cause of action has a substantial basis in law or is supported by a
substantial argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law."'' 0 Likewise, a motion for summary judgment shall be
granted unless the responding party demonstrates that the action "has
a substantial 'basis in fact and law or is supported by a substantial
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law..""' This standard, while stricter than the standards for motions
not involving public participation, does not reach the heightened level
147. An "action involving public petition and participation" is defined as "an action, claim,
cross claim or counterclaim for damages that is brought by a public applicant or permittee, and is
materially related to any efforts of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge or
oppose such appflication or permission." A "public applicant or permittee" is "any person who
has applied for or obtained a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate or other entitlement
for use or permission to act from any government body, or any person with an interest, connec-
tion or affiliation with such person that is materially related to such application or permission."
A "communication" is defined as "any statement, claim, allegation in a proceeding, decision,
protest, writing, argument, contention or other expression." And, a "government body" is "any
municipality, the state, any other political subdivision or agency of such, the federal government,
any public benefit corporation, or any public authority, board, or commission." N.Y. AB 4299,
at 2 (1992).
148. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
149. N.Y. AB 4299, at 2 (1992).
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id.
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of "substantial probability of prevailing" disapproved by the Califor-
nia Legislature and Governor."' It is unlikely that someone with a
valid claim would be hampered by this standard, although a SLAPP
disguised as a valid claim might be unhampered as well.
Importantly, the bill directed courts to grant priority to the hearing
of motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in such cases. "' Ide-
ally, legislation would prevent the filing of SLAPPs, but once one is
filed the suit should be disposed of quickly.5 4 Preferential hearings of
motions in alleged SLAPP suits would be welcomed by targets who
would have the opportunity to quickly eliminate the threat of the law-
suit. Likewise, filers with truly meritorious claims should welcome ex-
pedited hearings. The Texas and Virginia legislatures have recognized
this; anti-SLAPP legislation in those states has dealt only with the
preferential hearing of motions in cases involving public petition and
participation.
2. Preferential Hearing of Motions in Public Participation Suits
and Expedited Dismissal of Non-Meritorious Claims
a. Virginia: Let the Filer Beware
Virginia Senate Bill 424,'"1 filed by Senator Joe Gartlen, 56 did not
specifically provide for civil immunity for public participants. Instead,
tracing the standard set forth in Protect Our Mountain Environment
v. District Court,'57 it provided for summary dismissal of certain
claims, counterclaims or cross-claims if the right to petition under the
Virginia or United States Constitutions has been properly raised as a
defense. "8 To qualify, the claimant must be a person who has applied
for or obtained a "permit, zoning change, license, lease, certificate or
other entitlement for use or permission to act" or a person with a
materially related interest. 9 Also, the respondent must be a nongov-
ernmental individual or entity, and the claim must be based upon ad-
vocacy by the respondent that was directed toward the claimant
152. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
153. N.Y. AB 4299, at 3 (1992).
154. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
155. Va. SB 424 (1992). Virginia has a two-year legislative system, beginning in even-num-
bered years. Senate Bill 424 was not passed in the 1992 session, and will therefore be carried
forward to the 1993 session.
156. Dem., Mt. Vernon.
157. 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984). See also supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
158. Va. SB 424 (1992).
159. Id.
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before a governmental individual or body on an issue of public or
societal importance. 16o
In a case meeting these criteria, there is a comparatively weak stan-
dard of proof required for dismissal under the Virginia legislation, al-
though the burden of proof is on the target. The action shall be
dismissed if three tests are met. 6' First, the claimant's action or claim
must have been brought maliciously and with intent to harass the re-
spondent.'62 This apparently does not require proof that harassment
was a primary purpose, much less the sole purpose, as is the case in
New York's Assembly Bill 4299.16 Virginia Senate Bill 424 favors tar-
gets by eliminating their burden of proving the extent of the filer's
maliciousness or harassment in filing suit.
Second, the target's petitioning activities must have had "reasona-
ble factual support or a cognizable basis in law for their assertion,'"6'
This standard again seems advantageous to SLAPP targets as it re-
quires only "reasonable" factual support, and not that they act in
''good faith" in making the statements.
Third, the primary purpose of the respondent's activity must not
have been "to harass the claimant or achieve another improper objec-
tive." 65 This also favors the SLAPP target by permitting dismissal
even if harassment or improper objectives were just some of the mo-
tives, as long as they were not the primary ones. Perhaps fairer lan-
guage would be, "the respondent's activity was not intended to harass
the claimant or effectuate another improper objective." It is possible
that in attempting to provide protection for SLAPP targets this bill
has gone too far. It could result in unwarranted dismissals.
b. Texas: Testing the Waters166
Texas House Bill 149 (1990)67 pertained only to summary judgment
motions in limited circumstances. However, the burden was on the
160. Id.
161. The legislative language uses the word "shown" and does not indicate any heightened
burden of proof. In fact, the choice of the word "shown," instead of "proven," seems to indi-
cate a lower burden of proof.
162. Va. SB 424 (1992).
163. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
164. Va. SB 424 (1992).
165. Id.
166. Identical bills were filed during the first two special sessions of 1991 in order to ferret out
opposition. Because none surfaced, the bill will likely be refiled in 1993. Telephone Interview with
Scott Hochberg, Legislative Aide to Rep. Colbert (June 16, 1992).
167. Rep. Colbert filed this bill during the first special session of 1991 in response to problems
reported by constituents. He filed an identical bill, House Bill 58, during the second special ses-
sion, but it also was not considered. Colbert's legislative aide, Scott Hochberg, intended to run
for Colbert's seat in 1992 and planned to file the bill in 1993 if elected. Id.
SILENCING SLAPPs
person against whom summary judgment is sought (i.e., the filer) to
show that it should not be granted. Under this bill, the moving party
must allege that the cause of action was based on a position taken or
statements made by her in relation to a government proceeding, and
was thus barred because the conduct complained of was protected by
the right to petition the government for redress of grievances guaran-
teed by the United States or Texas Constitutions. 1 8 "Governmental
proceeding" was broadly defined as a "judicial, administrative, legis-
lative, or other governmental proceeding,' 69 which should avoid
problems with statutory construction. However, the bill apparently
would not protect a person who reports a problem that only later be-
comes the subject of a governmental proceeding, 70 or one whose com-
munication was not made at such a proceeding.
Under the Texas bill, summary judgment would be granted if the
filer fails to produce evidence that would permit the court to reasona-
bly conclude that the position taken or statements made by the target
did not have a basis in fact or lacked any basis in law, that the pri-
mary purpose of the suit was to "harass . . .or otherwise wrongfully
injure the respondent," and that the filer's actions "injured the re-
spondent."' 71 This latter requirement of actual injury to the respon-
dent is unique among the proposed legislation. The bill did not
contain any explanatory language indicating the depth of the injury or
whether a de minimis financial injury would qualify. If so, SLAPP
filers whose work has been delayed or otherwise inconvenienced by
the target's actions at a government hearing could easily meet this re-
quirement.
Another unique aspect of the Texas bill was that a target may peti-
tion the court for damages in conjunction with a summary judgment
filed under the law. If a successful target can demonstrate that the
action was brought to harass or injure, or to inhibit her participation
in a government proceeding, actual damages would be awarded. The
court had discretion to award punitive damages as well. 172 The ques-
tion remains whether potential plaintiffs would hesitate to use the
court system to vindicate real injuries for fear of being labeled as
SLAPP filers and required to pay damages.
168. Tex. HB 149, at 1-2 (1991).
169. Id. at 1.
170. See, e.g., supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (targets in Washington SLAPP suit).
171. Tex. HB 149, at 2 (1991).
172. Id. at 2-3.
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IV. A SOLUTION FOR FLORIDA
A. The Need
The Florida Constitution gives an absolute constitutional right to
petition the government for the redress of grievances and the law pro-
vides immunity for such petitioning. 73 However, this constitutional
right is not enough to protect against the threat, much less the filing,
of a SLAPP. Also, a SLAPP is successful if the target must spend
time and money in court proving the communication was protected.
Florida does not have a reliable remedy for SLAPPs. Certain types
of retaliation suits are addressed in Florida's "Whistle-blower's Act
of 1986." 174 However, this Act is of minimal utility in the fight against
SLAPP suits because it deals only with those actions taken by
agencies 75 or independent contractors 76 in retaliation for the report-
ing of a violation which already has occurred.' 77 SLAPP targets who
oppose future action at a public hearing are not shielded from liability
by this Act. Florida needs a statewide method of addressing SLAPP
suits.
Florida Attorney General Robert Butterworth's office has been con-
ducting a study of the SLAPP phenomenon since 1989 to determine
the extent of the problem in Florida. Initially, his office sent surveys
to citizens' and environmental groups statewide, requesting informa-
tion about any SLAPP suit in which the organization or its members
were involved, and seeking copies of pleadings or other papers relat-
ing to actual lawsuits.1 7 After the initial mailing, additional question-
173. "The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble, to instruct their representatives,
and to petition for redress of grievances." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added). See also
Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 810 (Fla. 1984); Gray v. Rodriguez, 481 So. 2d 1298, 1299
(Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
174. Ch. 86-233, 1986 Fla. Laws 1776 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 112.3187 (1991)).
175. An "agency" is defined as "any state, regional, county, local, or municipal government
entity, whether executive, judicial, or legislative; any official, officer, department, division, bu-
reau, commission, authority, or political subdivision therein; or any public school, community
college, or state university." Id. § 112.3187(3)(a).
176. An "independent contractor" is defined as "a person, other than an agency, engaged in
any business and who enters into a contract with an agency." Id. § 112.3187(3)(d).
177. Subsection (5) of the Whistle-blower's Act describes the nature of information disclosed
as: "[a]ny violation or suspected violation of any federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation
committed by an agency or independent contractor that creates and presents a substantial and
specific danger to the public's health, safety, or welfare" or "[a]ny act or suspected act of malfea-
sance, misfeasance... or neglect of duty committed by an agency." Id. § 112.3187(5)(a)-(b). "An
agency or independent contractor shall not take any adverse action that affects the rights or inter-
ests of a person in retaliation for the person's disclosure of information under this section." Id.
§ 112.3187(4)(b).
178. The questionnaire asked for the nature of the opposition that led to the threatened law-
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naires were sent based on leads supplied to the office. 7 9
As of July 1992, the office had received forty-three written respon-
ses to the more than 140 questionnaires mailed.8 0 Of these, twelve
reported no experience with SLAPPs, eleven reported threats of suits
that were never filed, and twenty reported threats and subsequent law-
suits.181 The Attorney General's Office believes that eighteen of the
twenty suits filed were genuine SLAPPs.1 12 Some responses illustrated
the extent of damage that can be done by SLAPP suits. For instance,
more than thirty responses maintained that the organization or indi-
vidual had been a target in a SLAPP suit, but that the target preferred
not to give details of the action because of fear of a subsequent suit
based on the reporting of the information to the Attorney General's
Office.'
B. Proposed Legislation
The Florida Legislature has the advantage of being able to consider
bills proposed in other states when drafting appropriate language for
this state. Two bills dealing with frivolous lawsuits were filed during
the Florida Legislature's 1992 Regular Session,'1 although one was
not specifically directed at SLAPPs.
House Bill 759,185 introduced by Representative Bruce Hoffman, 86
would have amended section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes, to provide
for an award of attorney's fees if an attorney or party brought or
suit (whether it resulted from expressing an opinion or from filing a formal objection to an ap-
proval or some other governmental action), whether the threatened suit affected the position
taken on the issue, whether the suit was actually filed, and if so, whether opposition was with-
drawn or the positions were changed as a result. It also asked for information about attorneys,
outcome of the cases, and expenses. Florida Attorney General's SLAPP Questionnaire (on file in
Attorney General's Office).
179. Telephone interview with Diana Sawaya-Crane, Cabinet aide in the office of Florida At-
torney General Robert Butterworth (June 30, 1992) [hereinafter Telephone Interview]. Sawaya-
Crane has been primarily responsible for the SLAPP survey.
180. Telephone Interview with Diana Sawaya-Crane, Cabinet aide (July 2, 1992).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. The instructions sent with the cover letter and questionnaire advised respondents that, as
a public agency, the Attorney General's Office is not authorized to keep documents confidential
at the request of the sender. Telephone interview, supra note 179. Most respondents who chose
not to give details responded by phone. Id.
184. Fla. HB 759 (1992); Fla. SB 2188 (1992).
185. Fla. HB 759 (1992). Representative Bruce Hoffman's bill was amended and passed by
both the Subcommittee and the Committee on the Judiciary, but the final version of the bill died
on the House calendar. FLA. LEaOs., PpovsiONAL LEGIsLAnTv BILL INFOMATION, 1992 REOULA
SEssloN, HIsoRY oF House Bnms at 75, HB 759.
186. Repub., Miami.
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defended an action that lacked substantial justification, or the action
or defense was used for delay or harassment. 87 This bill was influ-
enced by the federal Equal Access to Justice Act,' which requires
courts to analyze the substantial justification of the losing party's ar-
gument in determining whether to award attorney's fees.189 This lan-
guage would have been appropriate for dealing with SLAPPs because,
although sometimes facially valid, they arguably lack substantial justi-
fication. Again, however, there would be the problem of proving that
by a preponderance of the evidence. An advantage for targets was
that the language of this bill did not require them to establish that the
alleged harassment or attempt at delay was the sole or even primary
purpose of the original lawsuit.
The bill that was specifically directed toward SLAPP suits, Senate
Bill 2188,' 90 was filed by former Senator Sherry Walker' 9' in response
to problems reported by a constituent. 92 Walker's bill is similar in
many ways to legislation proposed in other states. Subsection (1) of
the bill recognized that:
Information provided by citizens concerning potential wrongdoing is
vital to effective law enforcement and the efficient operation of
government. The Legislature finds that the threat of a civil action for
damages can act as a deterrent to citizens who wish to report
information to public entities or who wish to speak out about a
public issue that affects them. The costs of defending against such
suits can be severely burdensome. The purpose of this act is to
protect individuals who make good-faith reports to appropriate
public entities or who in good faith and without actual malice
exercise the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. '9
Such a legislative intent section-not infrequent in Florida
legislation' 9 4-is especially important because public and judicial
187. Fla. HB 759 (1992).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
189. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, HB 759 (1992) Staff Analysis 2 (Feb. 13, 1992)
(on file with comm.). The analysis mentions parallel legislation in Colorado, but does not mention
Florida's Equal Access to Justice Act.
190. Fla. SB 2188 (1992). The bill was not considered by the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary, the first committee to which it was referred. FLA. LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BIL IN-
FORmATION, 1992 REGuLAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILS at 246, SB 2188. Before former
Senator Sherry Walker's announcement that she would not be seeking re-election in 1992, her
office stated that she planned to refile the bill next year. Telephone interview with Eileen Patrick,
aide to then-Senator Walker (May 13, 1992).
191. Dem., Waukeenah.
192. See supra note 190.
193. Fla. SB 2188, at 1-2 (1992).
194. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(2), discussed supra notes 174-77, and accompanying
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awareness is one of the important tools in deterring or defeating
SLAPPs. However, the first sentence seems unduly limiting. 95 The
phrase "concerning potential wrongdoing" should be removed. It
adds nothing and suggests that the Legislature meant to deal with only
a fraction of potential SLAPP suits, in direct contradiction to subsec-
tion (2) of the bill.' 96 Subsection (2) of the bill was similar to a provi-
sion in the Washington legislation' 97 and a proposed New Jersey
bill. 198 It provided that "[a] person who in good faith communicates a
complaint or information to any public entity' 99 regarding any matter
reasonably of concern to that entity is immune from liability for dam-
ages arising out of the communication.' ' 2 This language stems from
the right to petition. While it is non-specific as far as kinds of
communications"' and damages, it is specific enough to encompass
most situations in which SLAPP suits can arise, including testimony
at public hearings, communications to state agencies, and legislative
lobbying.
To effectively address other situations in which SLAPPs might
arise, such as after publication of a target's letter to the editor, the
Florida bill again mirrored the New Jersey legislation, 202 and sur-
passed the protection provided by the Washington law.203 The bill pro-
vided that "[a] person who in good faith and without actual malice
expresses an opinion or belief concerning a public issue that affects
the person is immune from liability for damages arising out of the
communication. "0 This language would protect SLAPP targets
whose allegedly tortious conduct was a non-governmental communi-
cation, such as a letter to the editor. However, it would not interfere
with a legitimate cause of action for defamation or slander because
the bill provides several forms of protection for the subject of the
communications: the target must not have "ulterior motives"; she
must act in good faith and without actual malice; and her immunity is
195. By whose standards is "wrongdoing" to be judged? Circumstances surrounding SLAPPs
involve hotly debated issues where there is no clear "right" and "wrong." The razing of trees to
provide low-cost housing might be a travesty to some, while interfering with these plans could
classify as "wrongdoing" to others.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 202-05.
197. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.510 (1991).
198. N.J. AB 190 (1992).
199. The definition of "public entity" is discussed infra text accompanying notes 214-15.
200. Fla. SB 2188, at 2 (1992).
201. N.Y. AB 4299, at 2 (1991) (defines "communication" as "any statement, claim, allega-
tion in a proceeding, decision, protest, writing, argument, contention or other expression").
202. N.J. AB 190, at 1 (1992).
203. WAH. REv. CODE § 4.24.500-.520 (1991).
204. Fla. SB 2188, at 2 (1992).
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limited to communications that are "public issues. ' ' 205 Obviously, a
personal dispute between two parties that was aired either at a public
meeting or in a letter to the editor would still be actionable.
Senate Bill 2188 also provided that "[iun addition to any other rem-
edies at law, a person who prevails in defending a suit for damages
under either of these circumstances is entitled to recover costs and rea-
sonable attorney's fees incurred in establishing the defense." 206 Both
the New Jersey legislation2°7 and the Washington law2°0 provided for
the recovery of damages, but neither specifically emphasized that the
recovery of damages under the anti-SLAPP law would not supersede
any other remedy. At worst this section is superfluous, and at best it
may serve to remind the attorneys for potential SLAPP filers that
their clients may be exposing themselves to additional liability by fil-
ing a harassment suit. Generally, courts in this country follow the
American Rule, with each side responsible for its own legal fees.
However, because much of the force behind the SLAPP is the finan-
cial cost imposed on the target for her defense, as well as the threat-
ened multimillion-dollar judgment, requiring malicious filers to pay
costs is a justifiable and appropriate sanction. Whether potential lia-
bility for costs and fees would serve as an adequate deterrent to the
actual prosecution of SLAPPs is unknown.
For targets who may not be able to afford adequate legal represen-
tation, subsection (3) of the bill allowed a public entity to intervene in
a lawsuit arising out of a complaint or information received by that
entity.209 The state Attorney General also was permitted to intervene
and defend against the suit regardless of whether or not the agency
chose to do so. 210 While other states' legislation has permitted inter-
vention, Florida is unique in permitting discretionary intervention by
the Attorney General in all cases. 21' This provision is especially advan-
205. The phrase "public issue" might be open to judicial interpretation as it is defined neither
in the Florida Statutes nor in any state court opinion. Difficulties which could arise include: how
many people need be affected before something becomes a "public issue"?; what is the nature of
a "public issue"?; and how closely must someone be involved in order to consider herself "af-
fected"? The last question probably would require arguments similar to those in standing cases,
and a person would have to prove a sufficient degree of involvement to have the "right" to make
such a public statement. Proving standing to sue might be difficult, as the U.S. Supreme Court
recently limited standing for environmental groups, at least in cases where the injury alleged is the
possibility of not having the opportunity to observe endangered species in the future. See Interior
Dep't v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
206. Fla. SB 2188, at 2 (1992).
207. N.J. AB 190 (1992).
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (1991).
209. Fla, SB 2188, at 2 (1992).
210. Id.
211. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.520 (1991); N.J. SB 3136, at 1 (1990).
SILENCING SLAPPs
tageous for Florida targets because the Attorney General is familiar
with the issues involved in SLAPP suits.
Of course, the public entity or Attorney General does not intervene
without some "risk." If either succeeds in proving the defense, it is
entitled to recover costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in es-
tablishing the defense. 12 However, if unsuccessful, the party bringing
the action (the alleged SLAPPer) would be entitled to recover costs
and fees incurred in proving the defense inapplicable or invalid. 21 Al-
though Washington's law contains the same provision, it is still un-
clear whether the possibility of being held liable for opposing party's
fees would make the agencies or attorney generals reluctant to get in-
volved. Agencies with strained budgets or without much need for pub-
lic participation might be reluctant to intervene. However, given the
Florida Attorney General's experience with SLAPP suits, perhaps that
office would be more likely to come to the aid of an apparent SLAPP
target.
The last subsection of Senate Bill 2188 defines "public entity," the
only term defined in the act, as "the Federal Government; the state,
including any branch thereof; any county, municipality, district, pub-
lic authority, public agency, or other political subdivision or public
body in this state; or any officer or employee of the foregoing enti-
ties. 2 14 The definition goes beyond that in the New Jersey bill to in-
clude "officers and employees," perhaps to reflect the obvious fact
that one does not report violations to political subdivisions them-
selves. Nonetheless, exactly what is encompassed in the term "Federal
Government" remains in question, as does the liability of people who
register their complaints outside the state border. 2'
Overall, this bill was one of the stronger pieces of anti-SLAPP leg-
islation filed in any state. It did not unacceptably infringe upon the
liberties of people whose rights are actually violated, intentionally or
not, by an overzealous activist. It protected potential targets, but also
put the checks of "good faith" and "without actual malice" on their
behavior. It also required that to receive immunity for communica-
tions made to someone other than a public entity, the matter must be
a "public issue" that "affects the person." If enacted, the bill should
effectively deter at least some SLAPPs, especially from filers without
extensive financial resources.
212. Fla. SB 2188, at 2(1992).
213. Id. at 2-3.
214. Jd. at 3.
215. See supra note 132.
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The bill was lacking in one area: It did not contain a provision for
accelerated consideration of motions to dismiss or for summary judg-
ment and, thus, possible prompt dismissal. Such a provision should be
added and, ideally, the burden of proof in these motions should be on
the plaintiff to show either that the target's action was not protected
by the First Amendment or that the cause of action has a substantial
basis in law. 216
Another way to strengthen the protection for potential targets with-
out adversely affecting the rights of good-faith plaintiffs would be to
impose increased responsibility on attorneys filing claims in which the
Petition Clause could be raised as a defense. Attorneys could be re-
quired to go beyond the "reasonable inquiry" required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11217 in suits that might be defensible under
subsection (2) of Senate Bill 2188 because of the dangers frivolous
suits present. Then, if the attorney proceeded with the filing or prose-
cution of a suit that a reasonably prudent practitioner would have re-
alized was a SLAPP, she could be sanctioned or disciplined
accordingly, in addition to sanctions under Rule 11218 and discipline
under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 21 9
A provision for the recovery of punitive damages in addition to fees
and costs also should be included. For those filers with extensive fi-
nancial resources and purely malicious motives, higher sanctions are
certainly appropriate. Punitive damages could be awarded in cases
where it is proven that the filer has disregarded the target's right to
petition the government and has filed suit for the primary purposes of
harassment or retaliation. 22 Although this would be difficult for most
targets to prove, the provision would still add force to the bill and
relieve targets of the burden of filing a new claim to recover punitive
damages.
Finally, it also might be wise to include a legislative disclaimer ad-
vising that the bill does not preclude the right of recovery under com-
216. See, e.g., N.Y. AB 4299 (1992); see also supra note 149 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
220. Anti-SLAPP legislation filed in Maryland in 1992 adopted this approach. Identical bills,
SB 51 (1992) and HB 486 (1992), provided that the target may recover compensatory damages "if
the SLAPP suit was started at least partly to harass, intimidate, punish, or otherwise maliciously
inhibit the exercise of the [target's] First Amendment rights," and punitive damages if such ha-
rassment was "the only purpose of the SLAPP suit." Neither bill passed in 1992. Rhode Island's
Senate Bill 2005 (1992) included similar language.
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mon law, statute, or rule, and additionally that it is not intended to
limit constitutional, statutory or common law protections available to
targets. 221
Incorporating these changes should deter the filing of SLAPPs and
provide the best available remedies to targets. If there is to be addi-
tional protection for SLAPP targets in Florida, it will have to be
achieved legislatively because the Florida Supreme Court declined to
adopt the sham standard in a case decided in October 199 2 .2
C. Londono v. Turkey Creek: Florida Rejects the POME Standard
Londono v. Turkey Creek arose as a result of a group of home-
owners' opposition to a developer's requested zoning changes and to a
pending purchase option by another development group. When the
permit was denied, the developers sued for slander of title, malicious
prosecution, tortious interference with a contract, tortious interfer-
ence with an advantageous business relationship, and civil conspiracy,
alleging that the denial was a direct result of the homeowners' actions
in appearing before various governmental boards and bodies.223
The trial court granted the homeowners' motions to dismiss, but the
First District Court of Appeal reversed,2 and the Florida Supreme
Court affirmed. 225 In his amicus curiae brief in support of petitioners,
the Attorney General had characterized the developers' suit as a
SLAPP filed in retaliation for the homeowners' efforts to protect
their property values, and advocated the adoption of the POME stan-
dard in Florida.226 However, the Florida Supreme Court concluded
that Florida law already provides adequate protection to persons peti-
tioning the government, " 7 although the Attorney General's survey re-
sults indicate that perhaps the court is mistaken.
V. CONCLUSION
Citizens can be denied neither the right to petition the government
and be heard on public issues nor the right to redress of legitimate
221. See, e.g., R.I. SB 2005, at 2 (1992).
222. Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc., 17 Fla. L. Weekly 662 (Fla. Oct. 29, 1992).
223. Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc., 577 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Apr. 12, 1991) (No. 76,765).
224. Turkey Creek, Inc. v. Londono, 567 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), jurisdiction ac-
cepted, 577 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Apr. 12, 1991) (No. 76,765).
225. Londono v. Turkey Creek Inc., 17 Fla. L. Weekly 662 (Fla. Oct. 29, 1992).
226. See Attorney General's Amicus Curiae Brief at 6. Id. See also supra notes 80-87 and
accompanying text (discussion of Protect Our Mountain Env't Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d
1361 (Colo. 1984)).
227. Londono v. Turkey Creek Inc., 17 Fla. L. Weekly 662 (Fla. Oct. 29, 1992).
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injuries from an abuse of the petition process. However, because
some see intimidation suits as an effective method of dealing with op-
position, Florida needs a statewide remedy to fight SLAPPs and to
ensure open public discussion and debate on issues crucial to the fu-
ture of the state. Public debate on environmental issues, a common
target of SLAPP suits, is especially critical in a state whose ecology
and ecosystems are threatened by growing population and increasing
development.
The citizens of Florida must be better educated about their rights
and responsibilities when petitioning the government or speaking out
on public issues. This will make them more confident, perhaps more
likely to participate, and certainly less likely to abandon their princi-
ples at the first hint of a SLAPP.
Florida also needs a legal means to deter the SLAPPs, and a
method of accelerated review and dismissal to dispose of the suits
once they are filed. Anti-SLAPP legislation is the most feasible and
flexible answer to the SLAPP problem, although it cannot offer a
complete solution. Legislation must be carefully drafted to avoid po-
tential infringement on the rights of persons with legitimate griev-
ances; but no matter how carefully drafted, legislation cannot
eradicate the intimidating effect of a threatened lawsuit that is never
filed.
The Florida Legislature should enact a bill that is similar to Senate
Bill 2188, but which also contains provision for accelerated review of
preliminary motions in suits involving potentially protected speech.
Notwithstanding the Florida Supreme Court's reluctance to adopt a
variation' of the POME standard, the Attorney General's study sug-
gests a need for general anti-SLAPP legislation which also provides
for attorney's fees and protection for non-petitioning activities, such
as letters to the editor. State legislators need to draft precise legisla-
tion that will effectively protect SLAPP targets and discourage misuse
of the legal system, while still preserving the constitutional rights of
the filers.
